The article discusses th e problem of m etaphor from the sem anti cal point of view, a t the lexical level. A lter havins explained why do m etaphors represent a touch stone of any semantical theory, and af ter having given a brief survey of possible theoretical solutions of the problem, the author exposes her own view of m etaphor based on late W ittgenstein's theory of meaning.
As a theoretical topic m etaphor is derived from rhetoric, where it was definer as one of the tropes, a figure of speach the function of which was adornment, decoration of dicourse. Although the question of m etaphor was raised within this particular domain it has not remained limited to the special interests of rhetoric, but has grown to an over whelming topic embracing problems of linguistics, a rt theory, Psychology, philosophy.
From the point, of view of rhetoric and poetics m etaphor is intere sting as one of the means of providing images for concepts, of dressing plain thought into a picturesque garment. W ithin this field metaphor is appreciated for its iconic character; it has even been defined as »a formula for the construction of icons«. 1 As one of the main characteristics of Poetic language, m etaphor was introduced into more general aesthetic debates about the tru th claim of poetic language, as well as into the debates concerning the productive function of fiction. The problem of metaphorical reference, namely the question: W hat are metaphorical expressions about? appears to be connected with the general problem of the reference of poetic discourse and with its ontological commitments, i.e. With ontological questions about the existence or nonexistence of the entities to which metaphorical expressions and hence -fiction in general -refer. The putative answer to the question w hether the suspension of ordinary reference in metaphorical expressions generates, at he same time, new, extra-ordinary reference, i.e. whether the constitution of metaphorical meaning implies the creation of a new reality, effects far reaching consequences in eas thetics, ontology and in the philosophy of language.
One possible approach to the topic is to focus on the cognitive aspect, questioning whether »understanding one thing in terms of ano ther« (2) brings new insights and what are the psychic mechanisms that eable such an understanding. Thus, m etaphor becomes one of the importan issues in epistemology and in its scientific counterpartcognitive psychology. Within this field metaphors are recognized as being function in the formation of concepts, the metaphorical process is paired with the imagination, the production of images th a t represents the first step in the »movement towards the genus«. 3 To acknowledge the function of metaphors in the formation and restructuring of our concepts means to assert their influence on our systems of everyday beliefs, as well as their importance in science. As far as science overlaps with »an affair of the imagination«,4 metaphors play in it an impor tant role, analogue to the use of models or to the paradigmswitch, i.e. to other methods of scientific discovery.
Within the domain of epistemology metaphor is treated prim arily as a m atter of thought, whereas its liguistic expression is considered to be no more than a reflection of the fundamental process th a t occurs in the mental realm. From the epistemological point of view the solution to the problem of metaphor lies in the identification of the cognitive process that precedes its verbal formulation. Linguists and philosophers who confirm the primacy of the mental sphere pay little attention to the linguistic realisation of metaphorical meaning which is said to be constituted at the prelingual stage.
On the other hand, those philosophers and linguists who claim the primacy of language, treat m etaphor as a m atter of »mere language«, namely as a semantical problem. From this point of view metaphor is recognized as a »semantic twist at the level of sense«,0 a clash produced by the deviation from the literal code. The most im portant problem in this domain is the relation between literal and metaphorical meaning and it is this very question that we intend to discuss here. This restriction to the domain of semantics in our case does not imply any final decision about the supposed primacy of language. The semanti cal approach is chosen as the most elementary one. Namely, since metaphor is recognised prim arily as a specific word combination, it seems the problem should first be solved at this level. We hope th a t the proposed solution of the semantical problem will also have some impli cations in other domains and thus give a clue to a holistic account.
To shift the explanation of metaphor from the prelingual to the lingual stage means to identify metaphorical meaning as a linguistic event and to imply certain linguistic strategies th a t account for its production and interpretation. Though selfevident this task turns out to be diffiicult to fulfil. On the one hand, m etaphors are recognized as the deviations from th e standard code, so the theory of meaning that accounts for the literal meaning soon gets into trouble trying to explain how metaphors work. On the other hand, their use is widespread not only in poetry and acience but also in our ordinary language; in fact many literal meanings are derived from metaphorical ones, so metaphors cannot possibly be considered to be of m arginal interest to semantics. This is why m etaphors represent a touchstone of any seman tical theory.
In its most elemetary version the dilema could be formulated as follows the theory of meaning should either deny the opposition lite ral-metaphorical, or acknowledge it, thus being compelled to develop different semantical strategies th a t account for the difference of mea ning. Hence, the recognized of the opposition literal -metaphorical seems to underm ine the possibility of a unified semantics and tio lead to a dualistic one. On the presumption th at a dualistic semantics repre sents an implausible solution, we intend to reinterpret the relation literal-metaphorical in a way th at would enable its explanation from the point of view of a unified theory of meaning, i.e. we hope it is possible to give an adequate account of both -the literal and the meta phorical meaning using the same category tools and still presserving their opposition.
The variety of interpretations of the relation: literal-metaphorical, reflects the variety of existing theories of meaning. The opposition literal-metaphorical is denied by the unified theories of meaning which choose either the literal or the metaphorical meaning as a paradism meaning, treating the other as a semantical delusion, a decline from th e model meaning, an informative loss. These theories imply a very strong normative, valuative aspect, thus exibiting their onesidedness. They succeed in giving an account of one type of meaning refusing to ack nowledge the semantical role of the other.
The continental tradition (Cassirer, Heidegger, Gadamer, Merleauponty, Derrida) that considers language to be a m etaphor of being chooses m etaphor as a paradigme of meaning th a t reveals the true nature of language. Hence, poetic discourse -w ith its opaqueness, i.e. impossibility to separate meanings from their exemplification in words, with its ambiguity, semantical density, possibility of multiple interpre tation -is recognized as an exclusive case of authentic discourse from which literal meanings, dead metaphors, are but a decline.
The Anglo-american, analytical tradition, on the contrary, tretas literal meaning as a paradigme case and metaphorical meaning as a deviation. Based on th e notions of objective reference, compositionality, transparence of meaning, unambiguity, these theories treat metaphor as an abuse or a specific use of literal expressions. To the philosophers of the Wienna circle (Carnap) m etaphor is but a meaningless symptom of emotions; according to a more recent, Davidson's interpretation, m etap hor belongs to the domain of use and can be compared with other uses such as »assertion, hinting, lying, promising or criticizing«.9 Although, according to Davidson, its, function is to evoke pictures and »inspire and prompt our insight«,7 metaphor achieves its aim simply, by making a literal statement, hence such an effect is produced without any parallel semantical changes.
From the point of view of the above mentioned theories of meaning the opposition literal-metaphorical does not represent a semantical problem. Where there is only one principle case of meaning, the common problem of finding the literal equivalent of metaphorical expressions becomes a pseudo-problem. As there could be no money exchange where a single currency is in the circulation, the literal paraphrase of m etap horical meaning turns cut to be unnecessary and impossible.
The refusal to take an exclusive position in semantis leads to compromises -to the theories that acknowleadge the opposition literalmetaphorical and search for its etplanation. The usual starting point is literal meaning as a standard case, whereas m etaphor is recognized as a meaningful disturbance of the standard code. Though posing a semantical problem, metaphor is here acknowledged as having a mea ning, so special techniques have to be invented to account for its semantic role.
Traditionally, metaphor if refered to as »saving one thing and meaning another«, as a transposed meaning, an indirect designation that is realized when we substitute metaphorical expression by a literal one. This traditional, substitutional approach sounds familiar, but on closer inspection it reveals its unreliability. It gives no account of the following questions: How do we recognize the violation of the literal code? Is metaphorical meaning to be identified with literal incompatib ility or with a new (literal) compatibility? Is the new semantic pertinence dependent on the literal meaning of words that form a metaphorical expression: If the new semantic pertinence is identified with some other literal meanings i. e, with a literal paraphrase, what exactly is the criterion of the substitution?
Beside these dificiencies, the substitutional approach has a more basic one: although seemingly confirming metaphors as meaningful, in fact it denies their semantic function. It reduces metaphors to no more than a mask that when taken off reveals the tru e face of meaning, which in principle can only be literal. Thus the positive answer to the question concerning the possibility of literal paraphrase, that was initially understood as the justification of the semantic role of meta phors, turns out to be its denial. The refusal to recognize m etaphor as a semantic model follows not only from the necessity of literal para phrase -that makes sense of otherwise meaningless expression -but from its very possibility. If the so called »metaphorical« interpretation of an expression that deviates from the literal code has no chance but to return to the literal code, metaphors produce no semantic inno vation. In order to be accepted as having a semantic function m eta phors should neither be reduced to their literal paraphrase, nor should in any way dependent on it.
The discussions about the inadequacy of literal paraphrase are usually raised by the analysis of poetic discourse that insists on the creative function of art proclaiming the »heresy of paraphrase«. Such disputes could with the same enthusiasm be focused on the question of catachresis. The principle, namely, that of semantic innovation is the same. In the case of catachresis metaphor fills in a lexical gap and starts to functioon as a part of th e literal vocabulary. Since it stands for a semantic innovation th at has no counterpart in the existing literal meanings, it is impossible to find its literal equivalent. Since it turns into a new literal meaning, its literal paraphrase also proves to be unnecessary. Thus, catachresis, as veil as metaphors in literature that are open to multiple interpretations, prove that their assumed literal equivalents represent neither necessary, nor a sufficient condition of our ability to invent and understand metaphors.
Such a claim seems to imply different semantical strategies in the case of metaphorical and literal meaning, so recent theories of metaphor, that find the traditional approach inadequate, engage themselves in w or king out these strategies. The substitutional view considered metaphorical meaning to be a mere denomination, or a transposed meaning, i.e. to be constituted at the lexical or the syntagmatic level, thus capable of being replaced by some analogue literal expression. The refulation of the substitutional view in modern theories, introduced mainly by Black's interactional theory, is characterised by the claim that metaphorical meaning was constitued on a supra-lexical level, namely that m etaphor should be regarded prim arily as a m atter of predication.
The proposed shift of the constitution of metaphorical meaning to the level of statem ent was induced by the failure of the attem pt to explain it at the lexical level. If we want to avoid the consequence of a dualistic semantics and try to explain the lexical meaning according to a single, in this case -literal -model, to which m etaphor proves not to be reducible, the next plausible step would be to presuppose some supra-lexical factors as relevant for the constitution of metapho rical meaning. Now the questions arise: How many linguistic variables do we need to take into account for the explanation of metaphorical meaning? What portions of language, of its competence and performance should be considered?
The way modern theories of m etaphor answer these questions could easily be used as the ground for their classification. Thus, besides the interactional theory that treats metaphorical meaning as being constituted at the level of statement, we distinguish theories hat consider metaphor to be a m atter of discourse -be it a text, a dialogue, a speech act or a language game. Whereas Black defines metaphorical meaning as »the system of associtated commonplaces evoked by the interaction of the principal and the sublidiary subject«,8 theories of another group proclaim semantic rules to be insufficient for its explanation. According to them the constitution of metaphorical meaning implies general rules of interpretation (hermeneutics), i.e. general pragm atic rules (Searle) . According to Searle's theory, which is but a refined version of the sub stitutional theory,9 interpretation of a metaphorical expression invol ves a list of pragmatic rules th at enable us to substitute meaningess literal expression by speaker's utterance meaning, i.e. by another, ade quate literal meaning. Such an explanation gives account of our under standing of metaphors shifting it simply to the domain of pragmatics, without disturbing the literal semantic model. Stressing th e importance of pragmatic rules in our understanding of w hat words actually, mean. Searle does not recognize the semantic role of the metaphorical expres sions, but treats them as pragmatic problems.
Some authors [J. Stern, for instance10] assume that not only our semantic, but also our pragmatic competence cannot explain our un derstanding of metaphors. They suggest that the interpretation of the metaphors analogous to the interpretation of indexical terms, must in volve some extralinguistic factors, such as perceiving and understand ing of the situational context, the interpreter's associations and men tal abilities, his relation to the speaker etc.
In such a way the problem metaphor becomes more and more va gue. Trying to restrict our problem to the domain of semantics we en ded by stating that the solution of the semantical problem implies the pragmatical, and even more generaly the epistemological approach. In the attempt to fulfil the impossible task of getting out of the dead-end street let me repeat once again with John Searle th a t »The problem« of metaphor is either very difficult or very easy«11 According to Searle the problem of metaphor as »very easy«.
Although the full account of metaphor should treat it as a m atter of discourse, it can also be analysed within the frames of semantics, as a m atter of »mere language«. Metaphor indeed is a m atter of »mere language«, it is the m atter of language par excellence. Metaphors are one of the most im portant means of semantic innovation, of th e exten sion of our vocabulary. By »teaching an old word new tricks«12 m etap hor, if not mere periphrasis, is not a means of denomination, but rather that of nomination. Opposing Davidson we may state that metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation mean, and something more.18 This additional meaning is a new Paradigme and as such cannot be replaced by any already existing common meaning. By using one term to refer to the supposed referent of the other, metaphor extends its Pattern of meaning, virtually producing new literal mea ning of the term used. Whether the semantic innovation produced by metaphorical nomination will become a part of our literal semantic RFFZd, 27(4) (1987/88) V. B O ŽlČEVIĆ: ON THE SEMANTICS competence depends on the habits of the language community, as well as nay nomination does.
Treating metaphor as an extension of literal meaning enables us to avoid the trap of a dualistic semantics as well as the presupposition that understanding metaphors involves some extra linguistic or extralinguistic knowledge. Stating th at the same semantic, pragmatic and epistemological principles govern the production and interpretation of literal and metaphorical meaning seems to overlook their opposition Indeed, metaphorical and literal meaning should not be considered as two sides of a single coin, but rather as tw o extreme positions in a continuum of possible uses. Thus, th e diferrence literal -metaphorical may be interpreted as the difference in degree, token and not a type difference.14 Consider, for instance, the following list of expressions: blue eyes, bright eyes, glittering eyes, weary eyes, golden eyes, eyes of ex perience, innocent eyes, inward eyes, eye of heaven, eyes-pearls, hey days of eyes . . . Although we are positive about the literacy of the first expression an the metaphoricity of the last one, it is difficult to draw the sharp line of distinction; it is difficult to decide where does the literal end and the metaphorical begin. W hether we are going to declare an expresion to be literal depends on the fact whether we recognize is as common.
Our view of metaphor rests on late W ittgenstein's idea that the meaning of a word is equal to its use, the idea th a t there should be no gap between semantics and pragmatics. If we understand the meaning of a word as the pattern of possible uses, not definitely fixed, but open to new ones, the metaphorical extension of literal meaning does not represent an extravagant case. Metaphors are partially context inde pendet, leaning on the literal past of the terms, whereas the understan ding of the produced semantic innovation is context dependent to the degree that any new meaning formation is, Davidson's example with a friend from Saturn10 who cannot tell learning a new literal usage of a word from understanding a m etaphor shows that there is indeed no principle, difference between the two. Although Davidson used his ex ample as an argument against novelty as the criterion, we assume that it on the contrary represent an argum ent in support of our assumption. It proves that th e diference between literal and metaphorical is gra dual, depending on what is considered as common use of a term.
The fact th at a metaphorical meaning may be understood as the acquisition of a new literal meaning, as well as the fact that a drill in the use of literal language may be understood as a m etaphor (Lakoff and Johnson report of a foreign student who understood the word »solution« (of the Problem) as a »chemical« metaphor11 shows that understanding literal and metaphorical meaning is based on the same semantic and pragmatic principles, shows th a t the difference literal me taphorical is not fixed, but relative, gradual, depending on our general linguistic abilities, on the general amount of knowledge, and on our self-confidence as speakers of the language.
Proccesses of language acquisition prove that understanding meta phors pressuposes no special semantic or pragmatic competence other than the one that is needed for learning literal language. On the other hand they show that there is a difference between understanding me taphors and recognizing them as metaphors. Children, for instance have no problem in understanding metaphors, in fact they are very prone to produce metaphors themselves not being aware that such expressions may not be understood literally. Speaking, we are usually not aware of our use of metaphorical expressions although we have ,no problem in producing and understanding them. 17 Only on rare occasions do we recognize an expression as a metaphor. Such a recognition pressuposea our knowledge about metaphor as a figure of speech which we usually gain at school. Without such a knowledge metaphorical expression may be recognized as »nouserious«. Recognizing m etaphor as metaphor pres suposes that both, the speaker and the interpreter, share the same linguistic habits, that they agree in what they consider 'to be the com mon way of speaking.
Un the other hand. if an expression, once understood as a metaphor, becomes a part of our ordinary language, if it becomes a »metaphor that we live by«18 il will neither be recognized as m etaphor any more, nor will it function as a metaphor any longer.19 Linguistic analysis may discover the metaphorical origine of many terms which we no longer consider metaphorical. »Dead« metaphors witness that their proccess of dying was not abrupt, but gradual, depending on the frequency and duration of their use.
The case of catachresis poses another problem, namely, how is it possible that we still recognize the metaphorical origin of a term once accepted as literal? Catachresis is recognized as a »dead« metaphor lhanks to parallel uses in different contexts, in which case we are prone to think of the more »concrete« term as prim ary (»to give money«), and the more »abstract« one (»to give a talk«) as its metaphorical extension. Such evidence still does not imply objective reference as the basis of meaning. Reverse cases in which a more »abstract« term is considered as common and a more »concrete« one as its metaphorical extension are possible as well. Metaphorical meaning, namely, repre sents a spreading of I he pattern of meaning which is not tied to objec tively existing referent, but which consists of the contexts of common uses.
If we consider novelty to be a single criterion for the difference between th e literal and the metaphorical we have to answer another serious remark, namely: How do we distiguish m etaphor from novel, but meaningless use? To answer this question let us recall Wittgenstein once more and his notion of »family resemblances«20 Although many different uses of a word can not be tied to an objectiv ely ex isting re-ferent, n o r be subsumed under one common denominator, they are connected by »family resemblance« ties. Our Production and under standing of literal as well as metaphorical meaning is based on the general cognitive presumption, on our ability io perceive to similarities. Usage of any literal term presupposes our ability to perceive .similarity between the context of actual utterance and contexts of past utterances. Production and understanding of metaphors leans on the same ability. W hether we shall accept a new utterance as literal, as metaphorical, or refute it as meaningless depends on the degree of its similarity to past utterances. The proccess of acceptance or refutation also embraces other general epistemological rules such as plausibility, verisimilitude, cohe rence etc. In any case, metaphors do not occur as cases of another type, i.e. similarities that account for their meaning may be seen as more subtle, not immediately present as those which account for the literal meaning, but not of another kind. As Ortony has put it: »All uses of language 'tend to stretch it; but in literal uses, language bounces back. Metaphors stretch language beyong its elastic limit«.21 Or rather, by stretching Language beyond its elastic limit metaphors make it more elastic.
We hope that our analysis of metaphorical meaning has proven that the difference between literal and metaphorical is the difference in de gree, that no Special semantic, pragmatic or extralinguistic knowledge in needed for the production and interpretation of metaphors other than the one that is implicit in any literal use of language. The Se mantic innovation produced by metaphors should not be considered aa a semantical problem different from any new meaning formation, from the acquisition of a new literal meaning. What has been confusing for the theoreticians of m etaphor is the fact that in the case of metaphors semantic innovatiion is Produced by means of literal terms the meaning of which seemed to be autonomous and fixed. The study of metaphor has proved th at the meanings of words should not be regarded as con text independent and fixed, that an artifical break between semantics and pragm atic leaves many semantical problems unsolved. The case of metaphor may be regarded as the crucial example for the inconsistency of such an attempt. Metaphor is undoubtedly one of the most im portant means of 'the formation of lexical meaning so it may not be regarded as a deviant, marginal case, or w hat is worse as an unsolved semantical Problem. The fact that the crucial semantical Problem turns out to be unsolvable within the frames of semantics seems to be a sufficient ar gument for the invalidity o such a semantics. f
